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In modern corporate enterprises, proxy relationships are common. Proxy problems 
occur because of information asymmetry and discrepancies between the objective 
functions of the consignor and the consignee. The Chinese operating State-owned 
assets management system contains such deficiencies as owner absence, excessive 
government direct intervention in enterprises’ business activities and the confusion 
between ownership and operating rights. The problems existing in the wholly 
State-owned enterprises are even more complex and serious. The singleness of wholly 
State-owned enterprises investors, the State-owned asset being owned by all the 
people and the proxy relationships due to the separation of ownership and operating 
rights contribute to the deficiencies and problems mentioned above. In that case, this 
essay takes the theory of the enterprises property rights and proxy relationships as a 
fundamental framework. Based on extensive highly effective research performed by 
the domestic scholars, this essay also absorbs and refers to the domestic and 
international study achievements on State-owned assets management and corporate 
governance. Competitively analyzing the practice and experiences abroad on 
corporate governance and State-owned assets management, this article carries out 
discussions and analysis on the practical problems on Chinese operating State-owned 
assets management and corporate governance of the wholly State-owned enterprises 
in the competitive Commerce & Distribution Industry. Some positive thinking has 
been brought forward on how to improve the corporate governance efficiency. 
This essay is composed of three parts as follows. 
The first part outlines the summary of the research development on corporate 














relevant concepts and the comparative analysis and comments on the status of 
State-owned assets management and corporate governance are introduced in this part. 
The second part focuses on the problems on the governance of wholly 
State-owned enterprises in the competitive Commerce & Distribution Industry. The 
root of the problems was analyzed using the property rights theory and proxy theory. 
In the third part, some positive thinking has been brought forward on how to 
improve the governance efficiency of wholly State-owned enterprises in 
Commerce & T Distribution Industry. To make the supervision and management 
system on assets complete so that the government does not directly involve the 
operation of enterprises and the capital operations; To innovate the stimulation 
mechanism in order to solve the problem on lacking of motivation; To make the 
corporate governance structure standardized and to coordinate the balances within 
corporate management; To establish the external control system and prevent the 
“internal control”; To perfect the Information Disclosure system and keep away the 
information asymmetry; To reinforce the professional ethics education and make the 
regulations play the role of effective sanctions. 
After completing all of the analysis above, the author thinks that the government 
should scientifically define the rights and obligations of State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) via 
legislation, and establish effectively mechanism to stimulate the consignor and the 
consignee. As the system which can scientifically allocate the Claim to Residue and 
residual rights of control for the consignor and the consignee is set up, the problems 
such as the consignor exceeding his authority, consignor absence and the consignee 














problems such as the excessive government direct intervention in enterprises’ business 
activities, inadequate stimulation, low efficiency and “internal control” existing 
widely in the wholly State-owned enterprises, some investigation and then some 
change like appropriate contraction in business should be done. The wholly 
State-owned enterprises should be established with the confines of what are 
prescribed in “Company Law”. For the wholly State-owned enterprises legally 
established, especially those in competitive industries which need to remain as what 
they were before due to policy factors, take those enterprises in Commerce & T 
Distribution Industry for example, in order to improve the corporate governance 
efficiency, the following should be done: establishing vertical proxy chains and 
market-oriented proxy relationships, making the corporate governance structure 
standardized, innovating the stimulation mechanism, fostering the market of Career 
Manager, perfecting the Information Disclosure system, making the regulations play 
the role of effective sanctions better. When the obvious problems such as “internal 
control” and so on are solved, the competitiveness of the enterprises and the rate of 
maintaining and increasing the value of State-owned assets can be improved. 
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